



MATERIAL-MEN AND THEIR LIENS.
"STATE statutes, which attempt to confer upon state courts a
remedy for marine torts and marine contracts, by proceedings
strictly in tem, are void:" The ifine v. Trevor, 4 Wallace U.
S. R. 555.
By the Constitution of the United States (Art. III., § 1), it is
enacted that "the judicial power of the United States shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as- the
Congress may, from time to time, orcain.and establish ;" and by
§ 2, clause 1, of the same article, it is enacted that "the judicial
power shall extend * * * * to all cases of adriiralty and
maritime Jij"risdiction." ' The 9th section of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 (1 U. S. Stat. at L. 76), declares that "The District
Court shall have, exclusively of, the courts of the several states,
* * * * cognisanee of all civil causes of admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction."
This jurisdiction has been repeatedly affirmed by the courts and
declared constitutional: Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304;.Slo-
cum v. Mayberry, 2 Id. 1; Gelston v, .Hoyt, 3 Id. 246 ; Waring
v. Olarke, 5 How. 451; Nhe iine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555; Th'e
Moses Taylor, Id. 411 ; in which last case it was declared, "that
the provisions of the 9th section- of the Judiciary Act, which
vests in the District Courts of the United States exclusive cogni
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sance of civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, is
constitutional."
The jurisdiction of our admiralty -courts, as to the liens of
material-men, only extends to liens on foreign ships or vessels.
These liens, according to the civil law and the general maritime
law, extend to all ships, without distinction,. whether foreign or
domestic: 1 Yalin Comm. 363; 1 Parsons' Mar. Law 492. But
although the jurisdiction of our admiralty courts originally ex-
tends only to foreign ships, yet they have exercised jurisdiction
where a lien on domestic ships is give" by the law of the state :n
which ,the supplies are- furnished or repairs performed: YTe
S.hooner Marion; 1 Story 68, 72; The Case of Peyroux'v..
Howard, 7 Pet. 324; The General Smith, 4 Wheat, 438; The
St. Jago de Cuba, 9 Id. 409 ; Pratt v. Reed, 19. How. 859; The
Brig Nestor, 1 Sumfter 73; The'Barque (-husan, 2. Story "455;
2 Parsons' Mar. Law 492.
The greatest difficulty has been in determining the extent of
the lien for repairs,'&c., in a port in the same state. That there
is no such lien recognised by our admiralty courts, except that
which a shipwright has at common law, ao long as he retains pos-
session, is very clear, and has been so affirmed by our courts:
The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438; The Schooner Marion, 1
Story 68; 72 ; Boon v. The Hornet, Crabbe 426 ; Tree v. -T
Tndiana, Id. 479.
Most of our states have, however, passed laws giving the lier
in certain cases, the laws of some states including contracts for
building, and in others being limited to repairs and supplies; and
in some states the laws include all ships, whether foreign or
domestic, and in others only domestic shipsengaged exclurively
in the navigation of the rivers of such states. These statutes,
generally, authorize a suit to enforce the lien, either ;n the state
courts or in the Admiralty Court sitting in that district: 2 Par-
sons' Mar. Law 493, n. 1.
We propose to discuss these' statt liens under the following
heads:-
I. Are these state statutes creating lieds unconstitutional; and
do they interfere with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Admiralty
Courts of the United States ?
II. The state legislatures have no power to confer any additional
jurisdiction upon the United States courts, but they may give
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a lien where none before existed, if not in conflict with the Con-
stitution of the United States.
I. In 1 he Hoses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States, December Term 1866, the court
declared, " that a statute of California, which authorizes actions
in rem against vessels for causes of action cognisable in the Admi-
ralty, to that extent invests her courts with admiralty jurisdic-
tion ;" * * * 1 and that the provisions of the 9th section of the
Judiciary Act which vests in the District Courts of the United
States exclusive cognisance of civil causes of admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction, is constitutional."
In the case of The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, decided at the
same term, the court held "that the grant of original admiralty
jurisdiction by the Act of 1789 (1 U. S. Stat. at L. 76), including
as it does all cases not covered by the Act of 1845 (5 Stat. at..L.
726), is exclusive, not only of all other Federal courts, but of all
state courts; and that, therefore, state statutes, which attempt to
confer'upon state courts a remedy for marine torts and marine con-
tracts, by proceedings strictly in rem, are void, because they are
in conflict with that Act of Congress."
Let us examine the facts as set forth in these cases, and under-
setand the grounds upon which they were decided. In the first
case, the steamship Moses Taylor, of over one thousand tons
burden, was owned by one Roberts of the city of New York, and
was employed by him in navigating the Pacific Ocean, and in
carrying passengers and freight between Panama and San Fran-
cisco. Two important, facts must not be lost sight of: First, The
Moses Taylor was a foreign vessel; and- there nevir has been
any question as to the jurisdiction of our Admiralty Courts to
enforce the lien hgainst foreign ships; and it has always been
held for this purpose, that each. state is considered as foreign to
the rest: The aeniral Smith, 4 Wheat. 438; Pratt v. Reed, 19
How. 359; The Brig Nestor, 1 Sum. 73.; -Davis v. Child, Davies
71 ; Nickerson v. The Schooner Monson, U. S. D. C. Mass., 5
Law Reporter 416 ; and second, that she navigated the high.seas,
and was seized at a'foreign port: North-v. Brig Eagle, Bqe
Adm. 78 ; The Jerusaleni, 2 Gall. 345 ; Zane v. The Brig P resi.
dent, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 453. This case, therefore, comes
directly under our admiralty jurisdiction, and is exclusively
under it.
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In the other case, The Hine v. Trevor, the ship Hine ivas
a foreign ship, and was at a foreign port, and the collision, the
cause of the suit, occurred on the Mississippi river, which places it
also under the exclusive jurisdiction of our admiralty courts. In
the first case the statute of California gave a lien upon all
steamers and vessels, including foreign as well as domestic ships;
in the other case the statute of Iowa gave a lien against any vessel
found in the waters of that state, including also both domestic
and foreign ships. Admiralty jurisdiction, in both of these cases,
was exclusive; for the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal
courts as granted by the Constitution is not limited to tide-water,
but extends wherever vessels float and navigation successfully aids
commerce: The Genesee Chief; 12 How. 457, approved and
affirmed by The ' Uine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. .563, and because the
vessels in both cases, were foreign vessels, at f6refgn ports, and
not domestic ships at home ports: The Schooner Marion, 1 Sto.
68, 73 ; Boon v. The Hornet, Crabbe 426 ;- The General Smith,
4 Wheat. 488; Cole v. The Atlantic, Crabbe 440; Ex parte
Lewis,. 2 Gall.' 488 ; Zane v. The Brig President, 4 Wash. C.
C. R. 453.
In The Mose8 Taylor, Mr. Justice Fi=, in delivering the
opinion of the court, says, that "the statute of California, to the
extent in 'which it authorizes aetions in rem against vessels for
causes of action cognisable in admiralty, invests her courts with
admiralty jurisdiction ;" and Mr. Justice MiLImR, in deliiering.
the opinion of the court in The Riune V.. Trevor, aftgr reviewing
and affirming The Mfoses Taylor, says, '.the state'courts have
been in theohabit of adjudicating causes, whichi, in the nature of
their subject-matter, are identical in -every sense with causes
which are acknowledged to be of admiralty and maritime cogni-
sance ;" * * * * " and if the facts of the -ase before us in this
record constitute a cause of admiralty cognisance, then the
remedy by a direct proceeding against the vessel belonged.to the
Federal courts alone, and was excluded from the state tribunvis
(4 Wall. 569). We therefore hold, from, the authorities pia-
sented, that state statutes, which attempt to confer upon stale
courts remedies strictly in rem against foreign ships found in tne
waters of those states, are unconstitutional ; because such statutes
would be giving to state courts the right to exercise concurrent
jurisdiction with the Admiralty Courts of the United Statr'i;
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whereas, the grant of original admiralty jurisdiction, by the Act
of 1789, is exclusive not only of all Federal courts, but of all
state courts.
But, on the other hand, we contend, that a statute, passed by a
state legislature giving the state courts a remedy by proceedings
in rem to enforce the local lien of a material-man against a
domestic ship in her home port-engaged in trade exclusively
within the borders of said state-between -ports and places of the
same state-in the purely internal commerce of the state-the
contract relating "exclusively to that commerce, and which does
not in any way affect trade or commerce with other states, is con-
stitutional, and does not interfere with the.exclusive jurisdiction
of our admiralty courts, and is not the subject of admiralty juris-
diction, but doncerns the purely internal trade of a state, the
jurisdiction over which belongs to the courts of the state.
If, then, a state has ,o right to authorize actions in rem against
vessels for causes of action cognisable in the admiralty-because
a cause of admiralty cognisance belongs only to the Federal
courts-the question arises, Have our admiralty courts any juris-
diction over'domestic ships in their home ports ? .,
* We have seen in regard to domestic ships, that if the builder,
or person making repairs, retains possession, he has a common-law
lien.; for this lien or "privilegium," by the civil law and the
general maritime law, extends to ships without distinction between
foreign and- domestic vessels. But according to the admiralty
law it is otherwise, and no lien is recognised on domestic ships:
Allen 'et al. v. Niwbury, 21 How. 244; Aaguire v-. Card, Id.
248.
By the old 12thI Rule of the Admiralty material-men could
proceed in rem against domestic ships, where the local law gave
a lien to them for supplies, repairs, and other "necessaries. In
May 1859, the old 12th Rule. was amended, and the new rule
declares that material-men mnay proceed in personam, but not in
rem, no matter whether the local law gives a lien or not, ag~inst
domestic ships for supplies, repairs, &c. Mr. Justice NELSON, in
delivering the opinion of the court in the case of M11fguire v,
Card, says, " we have at this term amended the 12th Rule of the
Admiralty, so as. to take from the District Courts the right of pro-
ceeding in rem against a domestic vessel for supplies and repairs,
which had- been assumed upon the authoiity of a lien given by
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state laws, it being conceded that no such lien existed according
to the admiralty law :" 21 How. 251.
In the case of The N. J. Steam Nav. Co. v. The. .erchants,
Bank, 6 How. 392, it was decided by the court that "the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the court in admiralty cases was conferred on
the National Government as closely connected with the grant of
the commercial power." I * * * "It is a maritime court insti-
tuted for the purpose of administering the law of the seas.
There seems to be ground, therefore, for restraining its jurisdic-
tion, in some measure$ within the limits of the grant of the com-
mercial power."
'This decision his been approved and affirmed by two subsequent
decisions. The first case was an appeal in admiralty from a
decree of the District Court for the district of Wisconsin.' The
libel states that the goods in question were shipped at the port of
Two Rivers in the state of .Wisconsin, to be delivered at the port
of Milwaukie in the same state; and .the court held, that the
admiralty jurisdiction " does not extend. to a case where there was
a shipment of goods from a port in a state to another port in the
same state, both being in Wisconsinl' * * * * '44 The District
Court of the United States had no jurisdiction over it in admi-
ralty, but that the jurisdiction l elonged to the. courts of th e state :"
Allen et al. v. Yewberry, 21 How. 246, 247.
I Te other"case was brought up by appeal from the Circuit.
Court of the United States for the district of California, "and the
Supreme Court reversed the decree 6f the court below, and re-
mitted the cause, with directions to dismiss the libel. It was a
proceeding in rem, in the District Court of California agaiist
the steamer Goliah, to recover a balance of an account, for coal
furnished to the steamer, under the lien law created by the statute
of California. The steamer was engaged .in trade exclusively
within the state of California. In delivering the opinion of the
court, Mr. Justice NLSON said, " We have determined to leave
all these liens depending upon state laws, and not arising out of
the maritime contract, to be enforced by the state courts. So in
respect to the completely internal commerce of the states, which
is the subject of regulation by their municipal laws; contracts
growing out of it should be left to be dealt with by its own tribu.
nals :" Maguire v. Card, 21 How. 251.
There is no conflict between the cases (Allen et al. v; Newbury
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and Maguire v. Card) reported in 21 Howard, and the cases
(The Moses Taylor and The Hfine v. Trevor) reported in 4 Wal.
lace. The court in The Hine v. Trevor decided, that "1 the state
courts have been in the habit of adjudicating causes, which-, in
the nature of their subject-matter, are identical iii every sense
with causes which are acknowledged to be of admiralty and mari-
time cognisance ; and it must be taken, therefore, as the settled
law of this court, that wherever the District Courts of the United
States have original cognisance of admiralty causes, by virtue of
the Act of 1789, that cognisance is exclusive, and no other court,
state or national, can exercise it." * * * "And if the facts of
the case before us in this record constitute a cause of admiralty
cognisance, then the remedy in rem against the vessel belongs to
the Federal courts and was excluded from the state tribunals."
In this case the Hine was navigating the Mississippi river, and
engaged in cdmmerce between the states, and was as between our
states considered as a foreign vessel it a foreign port. The same
facts control the case of The Mloses Taylor. But in the two
cases reported in 21 Howard, the vessels were not foreign vessels
or vessels at a foreign'port engaged in commerce between the
states ; but they'were domestic vessels engaged entirely and dis-
tinctly in the domestic commerce of a-state, which does not affect
the rights and privileges of- the commerce of other states, and
which comes within the limit of the grant of commercial power,
and strictly under the jurisdiction of the municipal laws of* the
states. These cases were not referred *to in the opinions of the
court in 4th Wallace, because the facts do not constitute a case
of admiralty cognisance, but one which comes directly under the
jurisdiction of the. state courts.
Hence,'we hold that a state has -as much right and authority to
pass a statute giving material-men a lien to be .enforCed in rem
against domestic vessels which' are engaged in commerce purely
and completely internal-which is carried on between ports of the
same state, and which does not extend to or affect other states, as
well as she has the right and power to enact a statute creating a
lien to be enforced in rem against a saw-mill, &c situate in ant
carrying on business in the state;. for by such statute she does
not confer upon her courts jurisdiction concurrent with that of the
United States' Admiralty Courts; and does not in 'my manner,
:ither in word or spirit of the ConstitutioD, assume jurisdiction
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over causes of action which, in the nature of their subject-matter,
are identical in every sense with causes which are acknowledged
to be of admiralty and maritime cognisance. The admiralty
courts have no original jurisdiction over domestic ships at home
ports, either under the Constitution of the United States, or by'
the Acts of 1789 or 1845, but have only exercised jurisdiction
where the state laws gave liens, which jurisdiction it has been
conceded does not 'exist, as there is no such lien existing accord-
ing to the admiralty law (21 How. 251) ; and that there never
has been any original jurisdiction in the United States relative to
domestic ships: 21 How. 244, 246, 248, 250.
• II. By the Constitution of the United States (Art. 1, § viii.,
clause iii.), it is declared that "Congress shall have power to
regulate commerce with foreign -nations, and among the *several
states," &c. ; and, by Art. x., "the powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
states, are reserved to the states respectively." The government
of the United States was eminently intended, among other pur-
poses" to secure certain personal rights, and to exact certain
personal duties. The Constitution confers upon the General-
Government a few special powers, but it confers them in- order
that the General Government may accomplish, for the -people
of each state, the advantages and blessings for 'which the -state--
governments are presumed to be inadequate. It lays upon the
people 'of the states and -the government certain restrictions, and -
lays them for the protection of the people against an exercise
of state power, deemed injurious to the general welfare.- When
the Constitution was framed, on account of. the 'relation of mari-
time commerce to the intercourse of the-people of the United
States with foreign nations, or to the intercourse of the people
of different states with each other, the whole -civil as well as
criminal jurisdiction in admiralty, original as well as appellate,
was given by the states to the government of the Union, subject,
however, to the powers reserved to the states under the Constitu.
tion, and which were not by them granted to the General Govern-
ment: Curtis on Const. vol. 2, 445, et seq. - And one of the powers
expressly reserved by the states, and not ceded by them to the "
government, is the power and right to regulate and control their
internal commerce. For, by the Constitution, " Congress shall
have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among
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the several states," &c. ; not to regulate the commerce of each
state ; and "the powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved
to the states respectively." It has never been questioned that the
American legislatures have the same unlimited power in regard
to legislation which resides in the British Parliament, except
where they are i'estrained by written constitutions. That must
be conceded to be a fundamental principle in the political organi-
zation of the American states. We cannot well comprehend how,
upon principle, it should be otherwise. The people, of course,
possess all legislative powers originally. They have committed
this in the most general and unlimited manner to the several state
legislatures, saving only such restrictions as are imposed by the
Constitution of the United States, or of the particular state in
question: -Thwrpe v. .Ve Rutland and Burlington Bailroad Co.,
Law Mag'. Jan. 1856, opinion of C. J. REDFIELD.
In Maguire v. Card, and Allen v. Newberry, it was held, that
under the Act of 1845 (5 U. S. Stat. at Large 726) the admiralty
courts had no jurisdiction over the domestic commerce of a state,
and that the restrictions mentioned in said act are declaratory
o.f the general law, and that they existed independently of that
statute. By this act the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts is
confined "to matters of contract and of tort arising in, upon, or
concerning steamboats and other vessels, employed in business
of commerce and navigation between ports and places in diffefent
states," &c. The court held "this restriction of the jurisdiction
to business carried on between ports and places in different states
was doubtless suggested by the limitation in the Constitution'of
the power in Congress to regulate commerce." "'There cer-
tainly can be no good reason,'.' says the court, "1 for extending
the jurisdiction of the admiralty over, this commerce * * * for,
according to the true interpretation of the grant of the commer-
cial power in the Constitution to Congress, it does not extend to or
embrace the purely internal commerce of q state ; and hence that
commerce is necessarily left to the regulation under stat6 au-
thority-" 21 How. 246,-247. It was held in Gibbon v- Ogden
that this power did not extend to the purely internal commerce
of a state. Chief Justice MARSHALL, in delivering the opinion
of the court in that case, observed: "It is not intended to say
that these words comprehend that commerce which is completely
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internal, which is carried on between man and man in a state, or
between ports of the same state, and which does not extend to or
affect other states. The genius and character of the whole gov-
ernment seem to be that its action is to be applied to all the
external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns
which affect the states generally, but not to those which are com-
pletely within a particular state, when they do not affect other
states, and with which it is not necessary to interfere for the pur-
pose of executing some of the general powers of the government.
The completely internal commerce of a state, then, may be con-
sidered as reserved for the state itself:" 9 Wheat. 194.
-And, therefore-, if the regulation of its internal commerce is
reserved for the state itself, all powers and means necessary to
that regulation, control, and government must necessarily -follow.
And if a state has the power to enact a law giving material-men
a lien against domestic* ships engaged in trade exclusively within
the state (which is strictly within the power to regulate internal
commerce, 21.How. 244, 248), it must necessarily have the power
to .prucribe the remedy by which the lien can be enforced 4nd
made effectual; for in order to invest the statute with force and
effect, it must be held that such a statute gives not only a.right,
but a remedy, and that the lien should be enforced in the manner
pointed out by the statute.
But, although the state legislatures have a right to give a lien
wheie none before exis ted, it is very clear that they have no power
to confer any additional jurisdiction upoa the United States courts.
The grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the- District Courts of the
United States by the 9th section of the Act of Congress, Septem-
ber 24th 1789, is co-extensive with this grant in'the Constitution,.
declaring "the judicial power shall extend * * * to all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" (4 Wall. 411, 555), subject
to the power reserved by the states to regulate and control their
uwn internal commerce: 9 Wheat. 194, 195; 6 How. 392; 21
Id. 244, 248. And if the Constitution gives to the United States
courts exclusive jurisdiction of all admiralty cases-which was
one of the powers specially delegated to. the government 'under
the Constitution-it is clear that the state cannot in any way
confer by statute, any additional jurisdiction upon these courts:
The United States v. Judge Peters, 5 Cranch 115.
if then there are no liens of material-men recognised by tue
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-admiralty courts of the United States'against domestic ships at
their home ports, and that the admiralty courts have no original,
and necessarily, no exclusive, jurisdiction over such liens, and
that such liens have their origin and foundation in state laws; and
that the District Courts, for want of jurisdiction, have not the
right to proceed in rem against domestic ships to enforce liens
given by state laws for supplies, repairs, &c., how are these state
liens to be enforced ? In the words of .the Supreme Court (21
How. 251), we answer, "all these liens depending upon state
laws must be enforced by the state courts."
. And who will doubt the right of a mechanic, who has performed
repairs upon a domestic ship, or one who has furnished supplies or
* othef necessaries to a domestic ship, engaged in the internal trade
and commerce of his state, to enforce in rem a state lien against
said ship in pursuance of the. laws of his state ? Will it be, for one
moment, argued, that because admiralty -has no jurisdiction -over
such a lien, therefore the, state courts can have none ? Or that be-
cause admiralty hat no jurisdiction, it can nevertheless prevent the
state courts from exercising such jurisdiction, on the ground that,
if there is any such jurisdiction, it must belong, to the admiralty
Courts on the principle of exclusive jurisdiction ? 'Or that beciuse
the admiralty courts assume jurisdiction, though against the Con-
stitution, and against the trie interpretation of the grant of the,
commercial power in that Constitution to Congress, therefore the
state courts are powerless to enforce the statutes of their states ?
We think -the law is clear as decided - by the Supreme Court
of the.United States ; and that the state legislatures. have .the
power to -pass a law giving a lien-when it is not in the nature
of its subject-matter identical in every sense with- causes- which
are ackno.wledged to be of admiralty and maritime congisance--to
material-men against domestic ships employed entirely in the in-
ternal trade and commerce of'the state; and that such liens can
be enforced in. rem against such ships by the state courts, and
that such proceedings are not in conflict with' the Constitution of
the United States, and do not in any way interfere with the -
exclusive jurisdiction of -the admiralty courts, not in any.manner
whatever conferring concurrent jurisdiction on the state courts
with the courts of admiralty. And further, that the jurisdiction
of the state courts to enforce such lien laws is an original juris-
diction, vested in the state courts by the state legislatures, inde-
